Wednesday Roundup: Reproductive Freedom Edition
Today, the Court issued a 5-4 decision upholding a nationwide ban on certain forms of abortion. This roundup will focus on that case:
- Jack Balkin notes that this decision reworks the Casey opinion:
the Court emphasizes Casey's holding that states have legitimate interests in protecting potential life throughout the pregnancy. The Court uses this interest to justify the ban on intact D&E. But there is a strange lack of fit between the interest asserted and the means used to further it. Banning intact D&E does not save a single fetus' life. Rather, it requires doctors to use standard (non-intact) forms of D&E or, as the Court at one point suggests, to inject the fetus with a chemical that kills it and then to remove the fetus intact. The actual interest the Court is asserting is not the interest in protecting potential life but rather an interest in not having the life of fetuses ended in ways that the legislature regards as particularly gruesome. That might be a legitimate interest (pace Lawrence v. Texas), but it is not the interest in potential life recognized in Casey.
- Ann Bartow notes what she describes as "the scariest sentence in the opinion:"
The Act’s failure to allow the banned procedure’s use where ” ‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the [mother’s] health,’ ” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 327-328, does not have the effect of imposing an unconstitutional burden on the abortion right.
- Ann Friedman focuses on Justice Ginsburg's dissent, noting Ginsburg's criticism of the Court's view of pregnant women:
Revealing in this regard, the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from '[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.' Because of women's fragile emotional state and because of the bond of love the mother has for her child,' the Court worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature of the intact D&E procedure. The solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the Constitution ideas that have long since been discredited. - David Bernstein focuses on Justice Thomas' concurrence, which implies that Thomas believes the abortion ban at issue in this case exceeded Congress' constitutionally granted powers. As ACSBlog guest blogger Lauren Saunders explains, Justice Thomas' narrow view of Congressional power would doom many federal laws, including "the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the sick leave portions of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act, as well as minimum wage and maximum hour laws and labor and environmental laws."
- Finally, Marty Lederman argues that this case is likely to be the first of many decisions reversing recent precedent which was supported by retired Justice O'Connor. Lederman's list of decisions likely to be overturned is below the fold.
These are among the cases in which Justice O'Connor's has been the decisive vote or opinion, and in which a more conservative Justice might well vote to overrule the governing precedent.Note: Because most Justices consider stare decisis a more serious obstacle in cases of statutory construction, those cases (e.g., the Davis and Jackson Title IX decisions) might be more secure, even if Justice O'Connor's replacement would not have agreed with her as a matter of first impression.
McCreary County v. ACLU (2005) -- Ten Commandments displays
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Educ. (2005) -- Title IX Liability for Retaliation
Rompilla v. Beard (2005) -- standard of reasonable competence that Sixth Amendment requires on the part of defense counsel
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing (2005) -- assessments for government speech
Smith v. Massachusetts (2005) -- double jeopardy
Small v. United States (2005) - felon firearm possession ban doesn't cover foreign convictions
Tennessee v. Lane (2004) -- Congress's Section 5 power
Hibbs v. Winn (2004) -- Tax Injunction Act
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA (2004) -- EPA authority under Clean Air Act to issue orders when a state conservation agency fails to act
McConnell v. FEC (2004) -- campaign finance
Groh v. Ramirez (2004) -- sufficiency of non-particularized search warrant
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) -- affirmative action
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (2003) -- no takings violation in IOLTA funding scheme
American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi (2003) -- presidential foreign-affairs "pre-emption" of state law
Stogner v. California (2003) -- ex post facto clause as applied to changes in statutes of limitations
Alabama v. Shelton (2002) -- right to counsel
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran (2002) -- upholding state laws giving patients the right to second doctor's opinion over HMOs' objections
Kelly v. South Carolina (2002) -- capital defendant's due process right to inform jury of his parole ineligibility
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (2001) -- upholding limits on "coordinated" political party expenditures
Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) -- prohibiting indefinite detention of immigrants under final orders of removal where no other country will accept them
Easley v. Cromartie (2001) -- race-based redistricting
Rogers v. Tennessee (2001) -- "judicial" ex post facto
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (2001) -- state action
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) -- "partial-birth abortion" ban
Mitchell v. Helms (1999) -- direct aid to religious schools
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educ. (1999) -- recognizing school district liability under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harrassment
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997) -- injunctions against abortion-clinic protestors
Richardson v. McKnight (1997) -- private prison guards not entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 suits
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison (1997) (dormant Commerce Clause)
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (1996) -- provisions of the Voting Rights Act are constitutional as applied to choice of candidates at party political conventions
Schlup v. Delo (1995) (habeas, actual innocence)
Written By:Christopher LaVigne On April 19, 2007 3:04 PM Written By:Austin Evers On April 19, 2007 3:42 PM
I'll be writing on this issue for ACSblog next week, but I wanted to at least jot this idea down today. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas indicates that he might have struck down the abortion ban for exceeding Congress's power under the commerce clause. Justice Scalia joined Thomas, but perhaps only on the grounds that Thomas was correct in stating that the commerce clause argument was not raised.
Thomas has a long-standing position limiting the commerce clause (Raich dissent, Lopez concurrence, e.g.). Given that, I don't think Thomas was bluffing when he said he would have nullified the federal abortion ban on those grounds. That is, Thomas could have been a fifth vote to strike the law. Scalia might have been a sixth.
There is no question, either, that the liberal justices would have upheld the law under the commerce power and voided it under their abortion jurisprudence. That is, they were going to be four votes to strike it no matter what.
That means that Kennedy, whose vote was certain based on Stenberg where he voted to uphold a partial birth abortion ban by a state, did not have to be the swing vote.
At this point in my research, I believe the pro choice movement made a significant strategic deciion in not raising a commerce clause challenge to this law that had a negative effect on their mission. Instead of charging towards an almost certain 5-4 decision against them, they could have had a better shot at a 5-4 or better victory. Yes, the victory would have been without the benefit of a majority opinion, but they were heading towards that anyway.
My question is whether this whole litigation was a major strategic blunder. would it have hurt to wait until a more sympathetic form of regulation came along before testing the new court?
Kennedy's opinion runs roughshod the Court's precedent since the Rehnquist Court's 1995 decision in US v. Lopez, reaffirmed in US v. Morrison. The court's "new" federalism analysis (it really flows seamlessly from the early 1900's commerce clause cases - e.g. Jones & Laughlin) has placed empahsis on the fact that no longer will the court (in the words of Justice Harlan) use "a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities." Since the Lopez decision, the Court has used a rational basis test to ensure the regulated activity bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce (if that be the power under which the regulation was enacted). Kennedy ignores all of this. Thomas and Scalia are the only ones to point this out, and this is unsuprising giving Thomas's concurrence in Lopez. Had this issue been presented at trial - for now I am operating under the assumption that it wasn't, for I haven't looked at the trial or appellate court proceedings - Thomas would, if true to his principles, have to hold the statute unconstitutional as an attempt to regulate an issue that has little bearing on interstate commerce and should be left to the traditional domain of the states. This decision, along with the decision in Bush v. Gore, regardless of the legal conclusion they reached (i.e. regardless of who became precedent or what form of abortion was outlawed) cast a dark shadow over the Court's so-called principled efforts (and the resulting precedent) to return to a state's-rights form of jurisprudence.