U.S. Supreme Court Hears Argument: Week of February 25, 2008
The U.S. Supreme Court will hear argument in four cases this week. Video of ACS' Preview of the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term is available in ACS' Multimedia Library. More information on the Term, including briefings, analysis, and videos, may be found here.
Monday, February 25
- Cuellar v. U.S. (06-1456) (definition of concealing crime proceeds under federal money-laundering law)
- Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent (06-1498) (federal preemption of state law-based claim of fraud on a federal agency regarding drug approval)
- Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. (07-214) (proof needed to show false claim in federal contracting)
- Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (07-219) (duty to pay punitive damages for ship spilling of oil in Alaska; maritime law issues)
Questions Presented are below the fold.
Whether merely hiding funds with no design to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is sufficient to support a money laundering conviction.
1. Whether, under the conflict preemption principles in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001), federal law preempts state law to the extent that it requires the fact-finder to determine whether the defendant committed fraud on a federal agency that impacted the agency’s product approval, where the agency—which is authorized by Congress to investigate and determine fraud—has not found any such fraud, and thus—as in Buckman—the state requirement would interfere with the agency’s critical functions.
2. Whether, under the conflict preemption principles in Buckman, federal law preempts the provision in a Michigan statute that allows a product liability claim to be maintained against a manufacturer of an FDA approved drug where, without an FDA finding of fraud on that agency, the fact-finder is required to make a finding under state law as to whether the manufacturer committed fraud-on-the-FDA and whether, in the absence of that fraud, the FDA would not have approved the drug.
Sections 3729(a)(2) and 3729(a)(3) of the False Claims Act impose liability upon anyone who uses a “false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government” or who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2), (a)(3). In direct conflict with the decisions of four other circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that Sections 3729(a)(2) and 3729(a)(3) “cover[] false claims made to parties other than the government so long as the claim will be paid with government funds.” The question presented is whether a plaintiff asserting a cause of action under Section 3729(a)(2) or Section 3729(a)(3) of the False Claims Act is required to prove that a false claim was submitted to the federal government, or whether it is sufficient to establish that the claim was paid using federal funds.
Is felony driving while intoxicated a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act?
An Alaska federal jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon under federal maritime law for the accidental grounding of the tanker Exxon Valdez and the resulting oil spill. The award did not punish for harm to the environment, which other proceedings had fully redressed, but only for lost income and similar economic harm to commercial fishermen and other private parties. Applying the Due Process Clause, the Ninth Circuit reduced the award to $2.5 billion—still 123 times the compensatory damages awarded and five times what the court found was the total, fully compensated loss to all private economic interests. The questions presented are:
1. May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a ship owner (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship’s master at sea, absent a finding that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner?
2. When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy?
3. Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history, within the limits allowed by (1) federal maritime law or (2) if maritime law could permit such an award, constitutional due process?