U.S. Supreme Court Hears Argument: Week of November 26, 2007
The U.S. Supreme Court will hear argument in four cases this week. Video of ACS' Preview of the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term is available in ACS' Multimedia Library. More information on the Term, including briefings, analysis, and videos, may be found here.
Monday, November 26
- Larue v. Dewolff (the permissibility of certain lawsuits by contributors to private pension plans for breaches of fiduciary duty)
Tuesday, November 27
- Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (a trusts and estates tax deduction question)
- New Jersey v. Delaware (the boundary between the two states)
Wednesday, November 28
- Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association (a preemption case regarding carriers that ship tobacco and other products and state health and safety laws)
Questions Presented are below the fold.
1. Section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2), provides that a “civil action may be brought * * * by a participant * * * for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. 1109 states that “a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any * * * duties imposed upon fiduciaries * * * shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.” The First Question Presented is: Does §502(a)(2) of ERISA permit a participant to bring an action to recover losses attributable to his account in a “defined contribution plan” that were caused by fiduciary breach?
2. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3), provides that a “civil action may be brought * * * by a participant * * * to obtain other appropriate equitable relief * * * to redress * * * violations” of the statute. The Second Question Presented is: Does §502(a)(3) permit a participant to bring an action for monetary “make-whole” relief to compensate for losses directly caused by fiduciary breach (known in premerger courts of equity as “surcharge”)?
Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
There is a deep, irreconcilable and widely noted conflict among the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Federal Circuits about the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) — which permits trusts and estates to deduct on their income tax returns certain administrative expenses — and whether the statute permits fees for investment management and advisory services to be fully deducted on trust’s and estate’s income tax returns. This is an important and recurring question of federal tax law that involves deductions by trusts and estates that total in the billions of dollars annually.
The Question Presented is: Whether 26 U.S.C. § 67(e) permits a full deduction for costs and fees for investment management and advisory services provided to trusts and estates.
New Jersey’s Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master: Article VII of the 1905 Compact between New Jersey and Delaware provides that “[e]ach State may, on its own side of the river, continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature, and to make grants, leases, and conveyances of riparian lands and rights under the laws of the respective States.” New Jersey excepts to the following conclusions of the Special Master with regard to Article VII of the Compact:
1. That, although New Jersey may make grants of riparian RIGHTS beyond the lowwater mark on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, it cannot make grants of riparian LANDS beyond the low-water mark. Report at 52, 99.
2. That New Jersey does not have exclusive riparian jurisdiction over improvements like piers and wharves on the New Jersey side of the river if they extend beyond the low-water mark. Report at 85-86, 99-100.
3. That Delaware may exercise its police power over riparian improvements like piers and wharves extending beyond the low-water mark on the New Jersey side, even to the extent of prohibiting improvements approved by New Jersey. Report at 85-86, 99-100.
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association
1. Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1) and 41713(b)(4)(A), preempts states from exercising their historic public health police powers to regulate carriers that deliver contraband such as tobacco and other dangerous substances to children.
2. Whether the FAAAA preempts states from exercising their historic public health police powers to require shippers of contraband such as tobacco and other dangerous substances to utilize a carrier that provides age verification and signature services to ensure that such substances are not delivered to children.